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Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas R. Taylor ("Taylor"), by and through counsel, submits this 
Reply Brief. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondents David Chamberlain, D.O. ("Dr. Chamberlain"), John M. Jacobs, M.D. 
("Dr. Jacobs"), and Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center ("EIRMC" and, collectively with Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Jacobs, "Respondents") each 
contest Taylor's arguments on appeal. Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC contend on appeal that the 
District Court properly looked to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)(2) rather than Rule 6(b), 
that the timing of Taylor's service of process was not justified by excusable neglect, that Taylor 
was not entitled to a stay nunc pro tunc of the service deadline, and that the District Court 
properly dismissed Taylor's claims against them. For his part, Dr. Jacobs contends that the order 
dismissing Taylor's claims against him constitutes a separate order that Taylor somehow did not 
contest in the District Court or appeal to this Court. 
Each of the Respondents' arguments fails. As between Rule 6(b) and Rule 4(a)(2), the 
fonner is the more specific rule and must govern. Rule 4(a)(2) is not mandatory in the sense that 
the Idaho Legislature uses that tenn, and the timing of service (as opposed to the fact of service) 
is not jurisdictional. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (a) must therefore infonn the Court's 
analysis ofthose two rules, and that analysis must favor a decision on the merits. The timing of 
Taylor's service is justified by excusable neglect. No Respondent addresses the reality that none 
of them sustained any prejudice by Taylor's short delay in serving them, and that dismissal 
would exploit only the most hypertechnical reading of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
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District Court either should have extended Taylor's service deadline or stayed the case nunc pro 
tunc to avoid this unnecessary and unjust result. 
Regarding Dr. Jacobs's contentions, they fail. The order dismissing Taylor's claims 
against Dr. Jacobs was an order amended at the instruction ofthe Idaho Supreme Court to ensure 
a final, appealable, reviewable judgment. The District Court plainly dismissed Taylor's claims 
against Dr. Jacobs on the same ground as it dismissed Taylor's other claims. Taylor filed a 
separate notice of appeal encompassing the dismissal of his claims against Dr. Jacobs. Dr. 
Jacobs makes a mere unsuccessful procedural argument and has waived his ability to contest the 
substance of the appeal. At a minimum, the District Comi's dismissal of Taylor's claims against 
Dr. Jacobs should be reversed. 
Finally, the Court should reject Respondents' requests for awards of attorney fees and 
costs against Taylor, and it should instead award such fees and costs against Respondents. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 6(b), not Rule 4(a)(2), Should Have Governed the District Court's 
Analysis. 
The lynchpin of Dr. Chamberlain's and EIRMC's arguments is that Rule 4(a)(2) is the 
more specific rule and must therefore govern, to the exclusion of Rule 6(b). As the following 
sections demonstrate, that is contrary to the plain language of both rules, as well as the 
instruction that Rule l(a) provides. The District Court committed legal error by failing to apply 
Rule 6(b) as the governing rule, and that legal error mandates reversal. 
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1. Rule 4(a)(2) Is Not "Mandatory" or "Jurisdictional" in the Proper Sense, 
and Its Interpretation Must Therefore Be Informed by Rule l(a). 
Both Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC argue that Rule 4( a)(2) is mandatory and 
jurisdictional and therefore not subject to Rule l(a). See Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710,711,587 
P.2d 1245, 1246 (excepting rules that are "mandatory or jurisdictional" from the purview of Rule 
1 (a». But nothing in the plain language of Rule 4(a)(2) identifies it as mandatory or 
jurisdictionaL In contrast, other rules that are mandatory or jurisdictional explicitly say so. See, 
e.g., LR.C.P. 83(s) ("The failure to physically file a notice of appeal ... shall be jurisdictional 
.... ,,).1 That plain language should govern this Court's inquiry. See Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 
148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.2d 494.497 (2009) ("[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the literal 
words of a statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent."); Action Collection 
Serv., Inc. v. Haught, 146 Idaho 300, 303-04,193 P.3d 460,463-64 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The plain 
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless 
the plain meaning leads to absurd results." (emphasis added». 
In support of their argument, Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC point not to the language of 
Rule 4(a)(2), but to Elliot v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678 (2012), wherein the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated that "Rule 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal 
where a party does not comply, absent a showing of good cause." See id. at 686 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). But that passage simply says that dismissal, as a sanction, is 
mandatory unless additional exceptions apply. It does not say that service within 180 days is 
I Neither Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC offer any explanation of why Rule 83(s) specifies 
that it is "jurisdictional," but Rule 4(a)(2) does not. 
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mandatory. When courts (and the Idaho rules drafters) refer to something as "mandatory and 
jurisdictional," they refer to the act a party must perfonn, not to the inevitability of a particular 
sanction as a result of failure to perfonn the act as specified. See, e.g., Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 
F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2012) (time periods governing the filing of a notice of appeal are 
"mandatory and jurisdictional"); Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(timely filing of petition for review "mandatory and jurisdictional"); see also LR.C.P. 83(s) 
(filing of notice of appeal is jurisdictional). The passage from Elliot upon which Dr. 
Chamberlain and EIRMC rely does not mean that service of process within 180 days is 
mandatory or jurisdictional. In any event, Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC ignore the last clause of 
that statement, which provides an exception from both the mandatory requirement of service 
within 180 days and the mandatory sanction of dismissal. Moreover, there is no dispute that a 
plaintiff can request an extension oftime to serve a defendant pursuant to Rule 6(b). Neither 
service within 180 days nor dismissal can be "mandatory" when there are such clearly defined 
exceptions to those rules. 
In further support of their argument, Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC cite to the 
umemarkable principle that "[ s ]ervice of process is the due process mechanism that vests a court 
with jurisdiction over a person." See McGloon v. Gv.ynn, 140 Idaho 727, 730, 100 P .3d 621,624 
(2004). Service is jurisdictional; the timing of service, when properly extended, is not. Leaving 
aside any disputes in interpretation, both Rule 4( a)(2) and Rule 6(b) provide mechanisms for 
extending the time of service. The timing of service is all that is at issue in this appeal. There is 
no dispute that Taylor served both Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC, and neither Dr. Chamberlain 
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nor EIRMC sought dismissal in the District Court on the ground that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over them.2 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC confuse thefact of service-which is mandatory and 
jurisdictional-with the timing of service, which the Rules recognize can be accomplished within 
a variety oftime1ines. Rule 4(a)(2) is not mandatory or jurisdictional in the sense the drafters of 
the Rules intended, and it is subject to Rule l(a). 
Rule l(a) requires courts to harmonize potentially conflicting rules in order to accomplish 
the purposes ofthe Rules, namely, to foster judgment on the merits rather than procedural 
technicalities. See I.R.C.P. 1 (a) (mandating that the Rules "be liberally construed to secure the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding"); see also Golay v. 
Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 396,797 P.2d 95, 104 (1990) (emphasizing the Idaho Supreme Court's 
"commitment to decide cases on their merits"). In Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., 102 Idaho 214, 
628 P.2d 1048 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court hannonized three Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure under the rubric of Rule 1 (a) to reverse an order dismissing a motion to substitute a 
party. See id. at 216, 618 P.2d at 1050. And in BUlln v. Bunn, supra-which both Dr. 
2 Dr. Chamberlain based his motion on Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 
12(b)( 5), which address insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process, 
respectively. R. Vol. 1, p. 49. Dr. Chamberlain did not rely upon Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2), 
which address lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, respectively. R. Vol. 1, p. 49. 
EIRMC similarly based its motion on Rule 12(b)(5). R. Vol. 1, p. 32. Dr. Chamberlain and 
EIRMC cannot argue now that Rule 4(a)(2) is "jurisdictional" when they did not seek a 
jurisdiction-based dismissal in the District Court. The mere fact that Rule 12(b) lists 
jurisdictional defects separate and apart from issues pertaining to service further demonstrates 
that Rule 4(a)(2)'s service requirements are not jurisdictional. 
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Chamberlain and EIRMC cite-the Idaho Supreme Court noted that Rule 1 (a) is particularly 
applicable where "no prejudice is shown by any delay which may have been occasioned." Id., 
99 Idaho at 712, 587 P.2d at 1247. 
Rule l(a) is not only applicable, but compels the Court to reconcile Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 
6(b) in a way that allows Taylor's claims to be heard on their merits. 
2. Rule 6(b) Is the More Specific Rule. 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC argue that Rule 4(a)(2) is the rule that more specifically 
govel11s, but they offer no explanation other than it is the rule that govel11S the timing of service 
of process. Their argument ignores the reality of what really is at issue in this appeal: the 
propriety of a request to extend the deadline for service. That question is govel11ed by one rule, 
and one rule only: Rule 6(b). 
Rule 6(b) provides as follows: 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by written 
stipulation, which does not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the 
convenience of the court, filed in the action, before or after the expiration of the 
specified period, may enlarge the period, or the court for cause shown may at any 
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by previous order or (2) upon motion made after the 
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to 
act was the result of excusable neglect; but the time may not be extended for 
taking any action under rules 50(b), 52 (b), 59 (b), (d), (e), and 60(b) except to the 
extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
See I.R.C.P. 6(b) (emphasis added). The plain language of Rule 6(b) contemplates situations 
precisely like the one at bar, namely, a request to enlarge a period of time to accomplish a task. 
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Indeed, Rule 6(b) expressly provides that such requests may be made even after the expiration of 
the deadline. ld. It also specifically exempts certain acts from its purview, but not the deadline 
for service or process. See id. If the Rules drafters had intended to exempt Rule 4(a)(2) from 
Rule 6(b)'s reach, they would have done so. They did not. 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC contend that if Rule 6(b) is allowed to trump Rule 4(a)(2) 
in the circumstances presented in this case, Rule 4(a)(2) would be rendered meaningless. But Dr. 
Chamberlain and EIRMC fail to note that their interpretation of Rule 4(a)(2) would, in turn, 
render Rule 6(b) meaningless. Rule 6(b) unambiguously and plainly provides that a party may 
seek an extension of time to serve a defendant even after the deadline has expired. Although 
Rule 6(b) enumerates rules whose terms trump Rule 6(b), Rule 4(a)(2) is not on that list. Dr. 
Chamberlain and EIRMC effectively ask this Court to include Rule 4(a)(2) on that list, but that is 
not a job to be undertaken in the course of this litigation. See I.R. c.P. 1 (b) (noting that Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure are "amended or repealed by order of the [Idaho] Supreme Court"). 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC further argue that permitting Taylor to bring the timing of 
his service of process out ofthe realm of Rule 4(a)(2)'s good cause standard, and into the realm 
of Rule 6(b)'s excusable neglect standard, simply by requesting an extension pursuant to Rule 6, 
rewards ignorance ofthe rules and allows Taylor to escape dismissal by a mere technicality. 
That argument ignores the fact that Rule lea) expressly contemplates that resolution. The Rules 
of Civil Procedure "are to be liberally construed, and a just result is always the ultimate goal to 
be accomplished." See Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 439, 566 P.2d 758,762 (1977); see also 
Bunn, supra, 99 Idaho at 711,587 P.2d at 1246 (noting that the "primary purpose" of the Rules 
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of Civil Procedure is "the disposition of causes upon their substantial merits without delay or 
prejudice"). Where two rules may lead a court down different paths, a court is obligated to 
choose the path that results in a resolution on the merits. Through the lens of Rule 1 (a), 
rewarding a plaintiff who files the right motion-even following expiration of the service 
deadline-is, practically speaking, no different than rewarding a defendant seeking to exploit a 
nonprejudicial nineteen-day delay in serving process to avoid a resolution on the merits. 
3. Rudd. Elliott. and Sammis Are All Readily Distinguishable: the Court 
Decides This Case on a Clean Slate as an Issue of First Impression. 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC speak of the Idaho Supreme Court decisions in Rudd v. 
Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 66 P.3d 230 (2003), Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280, 271 P.3d 678, and 
Sammis v. MagneTek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 319 (1997), as if they conclusively identify 
Rule 4(a)(2) as the rule governing the facts presented by this appeal, or as if they conclusively 
resolve any conflict between Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b). They do not. In fact, not one of those 
cases addressed a situation where any request was made, at any point, to extend the deadline for 
completing service of process. Indeed, as EIRMC itself admits in its brief, neither the Idaho 
Supreme Court nor the Idaho Court of Appeals has ever "applied an excusable neglect standard 
instead of the good cause standard imposed by LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) when a party has failed to serve a 
summons and complaint within the six ... month period of time mandated by LR.C.P. 4(a)(2)." 
See EIRMC's Br. at 8. Notably, none of the cases that EIRMC cites address a plaintiff's request 
for an extension of time to serve a defendant at any point, let alone following the expiration of 
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time to serve. Contrary to Dr. Chamberlain's and EIRMC's arguments, this Court decides this 
case on a clean slate as an issue of first impression. 
B. Principles of Excusable Neglect Justified the Timing of Taylor's Service of 
Process. 
Neither Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC dispute that the Rule 60(b) excusable neglect 
analysis informs the Rule 6(b) excusable neglect analysis. The Idaho Supreme Court has noted, 
in the Rule 60(b) analysis, that "in doubtful cases, the general rule is to incline toward granting 
relief. .. and bring about a judgment on the merits." See Orange Transp. Co. v. Taylor, 71 
Idaho 275,280-81,230 P.2d 689, 692-93 (1951). This is just such a case. 
1. Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC Have Waived Any Argument That They 
Were Prejudiced by the Timing of Service. and Lack of Prejudice is a Key 
Factor in the Excusable Neglect Analysis. 
The 800-pound gorilla that neither Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC wish to provoke is the 
indisputable reality that Taylor's short delay in serving process did not prejudice them. Neither 
Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC argued in the District Court that they were prejudiced by virtue of 
that delay, and neither ofthem argue that before this Court. They have therefore waived that 
argument, and this Court should conclude that they were not prejudiced. See Doe v. Doe, 150 
Idaho 432,436,247 P.3d 659, 663 (2011) (noting that with the exception of jurisdictional issues, 
"[a]n argument not raised below and not supported in the briefs is waived on appeal"). Prejudice 
is a predominant factor in the excusable neglect analysis. See Nelson v. Pwnnea, 106 Idaho 48, 
51, 675 P.2d 27,30 (1983) (noting "no demonstration of prejudice" in an excusable neglect 
analysis); Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., 74 Idaho 483, 491, 264 P.2d 466, 471 (1953) 
(noting "no showing that the rights of respondent were prejudiced by the delay"). As explained 
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above, lack of prejudice to an opposing party is also a key consideration underlying Rule 1 (a). 
See Bunn, supra, 99 Idaho at 712,587 P.2d at 1247. The lack of prejudice Dr. Chamberlain or 
EIRMC sustained should be a key, if not dispositive, factor in the Court's excusable neglect 
analysis. 
In contrast, Taylor stands to sustain devastating harm. As Taylor noted in his opening 
brief, although it is ilTelevant to a Rule 4(a)(2) good cause analysis whether a statute of 
limitations turns a without-prejudice dismissal into a with-prejudice dismissal,3 there is no reason 
why a district court cannot account for such a consideration in a Rule 6(b) excusable neglect 
anal ysis. Rule 6(b) invokes the discretion of the court. See I.R. C.P. 6(b) (noting that the court 
"may at any time in its discretion" order relief pursuant to Rule 6(b». As explained above, 
district courts should use their discretion to foster decisions on the merits. Here, although Taylor 
indisputably filed his complaint within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, enough 
time passed that a dismissal without prejudice is, practically speaking, a dismissal with prejudice. 
The District Court should have applied Rule 6(b), in contrast to Rule 4( a)(2), to obviate that 
harsh result. The balance of harms-a hannless nineteen-day delay in serving Dr. Chamberlain 
and EIRMC, versus dismissal (effectively with prejudice) of Taylor's claims-makes dismissal 
inordinately unjust. In the event the Court reaches the equitable, discretionary issue of excusable 
neglect, the Court should balance the relative harnls to conclude that Taylor's claims should not 
have been dismissed. 
3 See Sammis, supra, 130 Idaho at 347,941 P.2d at 319. 
10 
2. There Is No Evidence in the Record that Taylor Was Not Diligent In 
Attempting to Serve Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC. 
EIRMC and Dr. Chamberlain argue that Taylor was not diligent in attempting to serve 
them within the I80-day period. But diligence is an inquiry separate and distinct from any errors 
oflaw or fact Taylor committed. Separate and distinct from any such errors, neither Dr. 
Chamberlain nor EIRMC argued in the District Court, nor do they argue before this Court, that 
Taylor's delay was the product of "indifference or unreasonable delay." See Jonsson v. 
Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 639 n.2, 115 P.3d 726, 731 n.2 (2005) (applying a former statute). 
Indeed, excepting Taylor's delay itself, the record is devoid of any evidence that Taylor was 
indifferent to his case. Indeed, by his calculation, he served Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC 
months prior to his deadline. This factor tilts in Taylor's favor. 
3. Idaho Law Recognizes That, In Some Cases, Mistakes of Law Can Justify 
a Finding of Excusable Neglect: This Is One of Those Cases. 
Neither Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC seriously contend that Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 
113 Idaho 753, 747 P.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1987), and Stirm v. Puckett, 107 Idaho 1046,695 P.2d 
431 (Ct. App. 1985), are not good law, or that they do not stand for the proposition that a mistake 
of law may constitute excusable neglect under some circumstances. 
Dr. Chamberlain makes a strained argument that Taylor's reliance upon Moss v. 
Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165,765 P.2d 676 (1988), was unreasonable because although the Moss 
decision does not say that a party requested a stay, it does not say that "a party involved in the 
case did not request a stay." Dr. Chamberlain's Br. at 14 n.1. Dr. Chamberlain further points to 
various turns of phrase in the Moss opinion that indicate, to Dr. Chamberlain, that the plaintiff in 
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that case requested a stay. But the fact is that the Moss decision is silent regarding whether such 
a request was made, and that silence strongly suggests that the court unilaterally stayed the 
district court action pending resolution of prelitigation proceedings. 
For its part, EIRMC suggests that the Court of Appeals' decision in Washington Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913,865 P.2d 1004 (Ct. 
App. 1993), overrules Schraufnagel. That is not true. There, the Court of Appeals simply 
distinguished Schra~ifnagel on the ground that the Washington case involved "only a 
misinterpretation of or an ignorance of Idaho law," rather than "confusion over conflicting 
documents, statutes, or rules." See id. at 918,865 P.2d at 1009. The Washington court further 
noted that "courts must weigh each case in light of its unique facts." See id. 
This case is more like Schraufnagel than Washington. Here, there does exist a confusing 
and contradictory set of decisions. Despite Dr. Chamberlain's arguments, Idaho Code § 6-1006 
(1976), combined with Moss, strongly suggests that a stay oflitigation pending resolution of 
prelitigation proceedings is automatic-§ 6-1006 even uses the word "shall." See I.e. § 6-1006. 
Rudd apparently says something different, but even the Idaho Supreme Court cannot rewrite § 6-
1006. See Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Dept. of Agric., 143 Idaho 366, 373, 
146 P.3d 632, 639 (2006) ("It is for the legislature to rewrite its statutes, not this Court"). There 
is a contradiction in Idaho law regarding this point. This is not a case where Taylor was simply 
unaware that he had to serve Dr. Chamberlain or EIRMC within a l80-day period. Rather, 
significant and complicated questions surrounded the calculation of that time period. To the 
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extent Taylor made a mistake oflaw, it is precisely the type of mistake that Schrmifnagel 
contemplated as constituting excusable neglect. 
C. Alternatively, the District Court Should Have Stayed This Case Nunc Pro 
Tunc. 
Altematively, even ifthe Court declines to reverse the District Court on the legal issue of 
whether Rule 6(b) govemed, it should still reverse on whether the District Court erred by 
refusing to stay the case nunc pro tunc. As noted in Taylor's opening brief, this Court must 
decide two issues of first impression: (1) should the timing of a request to stay a case pursuant to 
§ 6-1006 matter; and (2) does a stay pursuant to § 6-1006 also toll Rule 4(a)(2)'s service 
deadline? Neither Dr. Chamberlain nor EIRMC offer any persuasive argument for why the 
answers to those questions should favor them. 
1. The Timing of a Request to Stay a Case Pursuant to § 6-1006 Is Irrelevant. 
Critically, Idaho Code § 6-1006 makes the granting of any request for a stay an 
unconditional requirement. See Idaho Code § 6-1006 ("[T]he district or other courts having 
jurisdiction of any pending such claims shall stay proceedings in the interest of the conduct of 
such proceedings before the panel." (emphasis added)); see also Moss, 115 Idaho at 167, 765 
P .2d at 678 (noting that "the district court is vested with authority to stay civil proceedings until 
the prelitigation screening panel renders its advisory opinion"). The Moss Court noted that "[a] 
contrary decision would not only render I.e. § 6-1006 superfluous, but would also contravene 
the settled proposition that, whenever possible, cases should be decided on the merits." See 
Moss, 115 Idaho at 167, 765 P.2d at 678. Therefore, if a stay is requested, the district court must 
grant that request. Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC give this indisputable principle short shrift. 
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Idaho law-statutory or otherwise-does not speak to when such a stay must be 
requested. Taylor has not located, nor has either Dr. Chamberlain or EIRMC identified, any law 
imposing a deadline. As Taylor argued in his opening brief, the rule should tum on whether the 
timing of the request prejudices any other party. Given that a district court must stay district 
court proceedings upon request, in deference to prelitigation proceedings, that is the only way to 
distinguish between requests for stays that occur immediately, that occur following simultaneous 
litigation in the district court, or that occur on the eve of pretrial proceedings. 
Dr. Chamberlain argues that a request for a stay made after the conclusion of prelitigation 
proceedings would not constitute a stay "in the interest of' prelitigation proceedings, see 
I.C. § 6-1006, as the proceedings are already terminated. That is a distinction without a 
difference. Section 6-1006 requires a stay upon request, but no law imposes a deadline for 
requesting such a stay. If the District Court would have had to grant the request anyway, the 
party seeking dismissal should be required to demonstrate why the timing prejudiced it. A 
contrary rule would improperly elevate-contrary to the plain intent of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure--procedural technicalities over substantial resolutions on the merits. Here, not only 
does Dr. Chamberlain (and EIRMC) not argue any resulting prejudice, they cannot, as Taylor's 
delay was simply too short. 
2. A Stay Pursuant to § 6-1006 Tolls Rule 4(a)(2)' s Service Deadline. 
Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC suggest that the Idaho Supreme Court, in Rudd and Elliott, 
have already decided that a stay pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1006 does not toll Rule 4( a)(2) , s 
service deadline. That is incorrect. Rudd expressly declined to address "whether a stay pursuant 
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to Idaho Code § 6-1006 would justify failing to serve the summons and complaint while that stay 
was in effect." See Rudd, 138 Idaho at 531,66 P.3d at 235. Moreover, as noted above, Rudd did 
not concern a request for a stay. See generally id. The Elliot Court did not reach that issue, 
either. This is yet another issue of first impression for this Court. 
The stated purpose of prelitigation screening proceedings is to promote nonjudicial 
settlement. See Idaho Code § 6-1001 (legislative history) (noting that it is "in the public interest 
to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by providing for 
prelitigation screening of such claims by a hearing panel as provided in this act"); see also S.L. 
1976, ch. 278, § 1. Similarly, § 6-1005 tolls the statute oflimitations "in the interest of due 
consideration being given to such proceedings and in the interest of encouraging consideration of 
claims informally and without the necessity oflitigation." See Idaho Code 6-1005 (1976). 
Everything about the prelitigation procedure points to a purpose of fostering settlement, and § 6-
1006 should be construed consistent with that purpose. 
During the thirty-day period following the conclusion of prelitigation proceedings, 
"neither party shall commence or prosecute litigation involving the issues submitted to the 
panel." See Idaho Code § 6-1006 (emphasis added). That language infonns the scope ofthe 
stay. If a plaintiff cannot even commence a lawsuit, it plainly cannot move it forward by serving 
opposing parties with process. And not tolling the service deadline would undermine the very 
purpose of prelitigation proceedings, which is to reach, if possible, a nonjudicial resolution to 
medical malpractice claims, and requiring prelitigation proceedings to take precedence over 
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litigation to achieve that end. Although the Rudd Court left open the issue of whether a stay 
pursuant to § 6-1006 would toll the service deadline, it appears rather obvious that it would. 
D. The Court Should Disregard Dr. Jacobs's Arguments and Reverse the 
District Court's Dismissal of Taylor's Claims Against Him. 
In his brief, Dr. Jacobs does not address any of the substantive issues surrounding the 
District Court's dismissal of Taylor's claims against him. Nor did he even seek dismissal of 
Taylor's claims in the District Court; rather, he answered. R. Vol. 1, p. 66. He has therefore 
waived, for purposes of appeal, any argument that the District Court properly dismissed Taylor's 
claims against him. See Doe, 150 Idaho at 436,247 P.3d at 663 (noting that with the exception 
of jurisdictional issues, "[a]n argument not raised below and not supported in the briefs is waived 
on appeal"). 
Dr. Jacobs's sole argument on appeal is that the order dismissing Taylor's claims against 
him is separate from any order Taylor appeals, and that Taylor has not briefed any arguments 
bearing on his claims against Dr. Jacobs. Dr. Jacobs's argument is puzzling given that Taylor's 
Amended Notice of Appeal, filed with the District Court on January 30, 2012, explicitly notes 
that it is an appeal of the District Court's December 19,2011, Amended Judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 
156. It further lists Dr. Jacobs and his counsel as recipients of the Amended Notice of Appeal. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 156. Taylor made identical clarifications in his Second Amended Notice of Appeal, 
filed February 23,2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 167. To the extent the Amended Notice of Appeal (or the 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal) is silent as to arf,TUments Taylor makes with respect to Dr. 
Jacobs, that is because Dr. Jacobs did not object to service of process upon him in the District 
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Court (but rather merely answered). R. Vol. 1, p. 66. The District Court itself did not offer any 
rationale for dismissing Taylor's claims against Dr. Jacobs except for the fact that the Idaho 
Supreme Court required dismissal of all claims so that a final judgment might lie. R. Vol. 1, p. 
151. Any argument that Taylor did not appeal the District Court's Amended Judgment, insofar 
as it involves Dr. Jacobs, is simply not accurate. 
Dr. Jacobs suggests that Taylor should have somehow objected to the District Court's 
dismissal of his claims against Dr. Jacobs, but that argument ignores the procedural history in the 
District Court. On October 3, 2011, the District Court entered judgment dismissing Taylor's 
claims against Dr. Chamberlain and EIRMC. R. Vol. 1, p. 144. Taylor filed his initial Notice of 
Appeal of that judgment on November 14,2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 146. On December 14,2011, the 
Idaho Supreme Court suspended Taylor's appeal on the ground that an appealable judgment was 
not in place, and it remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to the District Court 
to enter either a final judgment as to all parties or a Rule 54(b) certificate. Five days later (two 
of which were weekend days), on December 19, 2011, the District Court entered an Amended 
Judgment dismissing Taylor's claims against Dr. Jacobs. R. Vol. 1, p. 151. Neither the Idaho 
Supreme Court nor the District Court afforded Taylor any time to object to the Supreme Court's 
instructions or to argue that Taylor's claims against Dr. Jacobs should not be dismissed. (Of 
course, Dr. Jacobs did not make any argument either, having already answered Taylor's 
complaint.) Upon dismissal, Taylor simply elected to appeal rather than to seek relief from the 
judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which was his right to do. 
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It is also inaccurate to argue that Taylor asserted no arguments against Dr. Jacobs in his 
opening brief. Because the District Court plainly dismissed Taylor's claims against Dr. Jacobs 
for failure to timely serve, Taylor's opening brief directs its arguments toward "Respondents," 
which Taylor defines to include Dr. Jacobs. EvelY argument in Taylor's opening brief is directed 
toward Dr. Jacobs. 4 
Taylor has not waived any arguments that the dismissal of his claims against Dr. Jacobs 
should be reversed. He made each ofthose arguments in connection with his claims against Dr. 
Chamberlain and EIRMC, and the District Court plainly dismissed Taylor's claims against Dr. 
Jacobs on the same basis. To the contrary, Dr. Jacobs has waived any argument pertaining to the 
substance of Taylor's appeal, having elected to respond to Taylor's appeal on purely procedural 
grounds. This Court should, at a minimum, reverse the District Court's dismissal of Taylor's 
claims against Dr. Jacobs and remand those claims to the District Court for a resolution on the 
merits. 
E. The Court Should Decline to Award Attorney Fees and Costs to Respondents 
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, and Instead Award Them to Taylor. 
In order to recover attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 
(1987), Respondents must demonstrate that Taylor brought his appeal "frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation." See Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 132 Idaho 531, 
536, 976 P.2d 457,462 (1999). Specifically, to justify an award of fees or costs, the Court must 
4 Critically, although Dr. Jacobs claims that the order dismissing Taylor's claims against 
him is a "separate" order, he nowhere on appeal explains his understanding of why the District 
Court dismissed Taylor's claims against him, or why his understanding is different from the 
substance of Taylor's appeal. 
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be "left with the abiding beliefthat the appeal was brought [ or] pursued ... frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." See Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 
918,591 P.2d 1078,1086 (1979). Appeals of issues of first impression do not warrant awards of 
attorney fees pursuant to § 12-12l. See Gustaves v. Gustaves, l38 Idaho 64, 71, 57 P.3d 775, 
782 (2002) (declining to award attorney fees on appeal where the appeal "presented a legal 
question of first impression"). Moreover, "attorney fees will not be awarded [on appeal] where 
the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was 
presented." See Minich, supra, 99 Idaho at 918,591 P.2d at 1085. 
As explained above, this appeal offers at least two issues of first impression, namely, the 
interplay between Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b), and whether a stay pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
1006 tolls a deadline for service. No Idaho appellate court has reached these issues. Taylor's 
arguments in that regard are not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Rather, they 
present, in good faith, genuine issues oflaw that are, in fact, meritorious. For these reasons, the 
COUli should decline to impose an award of fees and costs upon Taylor, but should award fees 
and costs to Taylor against Respondents. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This appeal presents at least two issues of first impression: (1) whether Rule 6(b) governs 
over Rule 4(a)(2)'s service of process deadline and good cause standard, and (2) whether a stay 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1006 stays a plaintiff s deadline to serve a defendant. Numerous 
additional issues emanate from those two principal questions. This Court should resolve these 
issues in light of Rule l(a). The District Court committed legal error by failing to apply Rule 
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6(b)'s excusable neglect standard to Taylor's service of his complaint. Alternatively, the District 
COUli erred by failing to impose a mandatory stay upon litigation in light of the prelitigation 
proceedings, regardless of the timing of Taylor's request. Finally, Taylor's appeal is not 
frivolous, but meritorious; he should recover fees, not Respondents. 
DATED this X day of September, 2012. 
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